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This is one of a series of pamphlets concerning issues that are
fundamental to the maintenance of a free society. These pamphlets and related materials are published by the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, California.
The Center is now the main activity of the Fund for the
Republic, Inc.
The studies of the Center are directed at clarifying basic
questions of freedom and justice, especially those constitutional
questions raised by the emergence of twentieh century institutions. The task of clarification is being undertaken by a group
of distinguished Americans acting as Consultants to the Center.
One of the areas of study is war in relation to democratic institutions. This paper by Harrison Brown and James Real was written in connection with this study. Dr. Brown, one of the Center's
Consultants and professor of geochemistry at the California
Institute of Technology, is a noted scientist and the author of
"The Challenge of Man's Future" and "The Next Hundred Years,"
among other books. Mr. Real, who has been collaborating with
Dr. Brown in this area for some time, is a management and sales
consultant and an adviser to the Center's Study of the Political
Process.
The Center for the Study of Democratic lnstitutions is a nonprofit educational enterprise established by the Fund for the
Republic to promote the principles of individual liberty expressed
in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Contributors to publications issued under the auspices of the Center
are responsible for their statements of fact and expressions of
opinions. The Center is responsible only for determining that the
material should be presented to the public as a contribution to
the discussion of the Free Society.
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A N O T E OF E X P L A N A T I O N

Among the studies of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has been a continuing examination of
United States foreign and military policy. As background
for further discussions, we were asked to prepare a paper
on the arms race as it relates to the technology of modem
war. We were asked two questions: What is the nature of
the arms race? What are the consequences of its perpetuation likely to be?
We have attempted to project the present trends of the
arms race into the future. The projection which emerges
is admittedly a depressing one, yet it is not without its hopeful aspects. The problems which confront us, and which
are outlined, are certainly unprecedented in history. But,
like most problems, they are soluble once they are understood.
In this paper we present many problems, but no solutions.
We hope that the presentation contributes in some measure
to their eventual solution by helping to create a broader base
of understanding of the critical situation in which the world
now finds itself.
HARRISON BROWN
JAMES REAL

Foreword

This little but important study, revealing and explaining the
terrifying dimensions of destruction that thermonuclear weapons
have reached, as one ironic development of the rapid advances of
our technical civilization, should be read and studied by every
thoughtful American. It will dispel many illusions.
Most Americans are aware that one aspect of the rather inconvenient "cold waryybetween the two power blocs, which divide the
world between them, is the possibility of a nuclear war. They are
vaguely uneasy about this possibility; but they are not inclined to
inquire further into the dreadful abyss at the edge of which two
giants are wrestling each other. They are diffident about further
inquiries, partly for the same psychological reasons that we are
loath to look into a great depth lest dizziness overtake us. But
Americans are also loath to make further inquiries because they
have been assured that we are building bigger and bigger bombs
in order to deter aggression; and that we are anxious to come to
an agreement with the Russians, if they will only be reasonable
about an inspection system.
These complacent assurances, intended to quiet the residual
anxiety of thoughtful people, leaves at least two factors out of
account. The one is that, while neither side would probably start
a nuclear war, the present attitudes or policies of both sides,
expressed in the phrase "arms to parley," are strikingly similar, so
much so that without some new impetus from the public tbc
*

stalemate is likely to continue. But the second f a d is even more
important. It is that while we have this immediate peace through
a "balance of terror'' the most terrifying arms race of history is,
in fact, proceeding at an ever more accelerated pace. This study
is intended to reveal both the dimension of destruction of the
bomb, which is one portion of the competition in military technology, and of the delivery system, that is the missiles, which
constitutes the other dimension.
There is a dim awareness in the general public of the magnitudes
involved in both portions of this competition in weapons technology. But this study, for the &st time I think, gives vivid images
of the terrifying possibilities of destruction in the thermonuclear
weapons, and of the annihilation of space and time which is the
consequence of technical advances in the delivery system. This
latter development makes war by miscalculation or misadventure
more and more a probability rather than a possibility. There is,
as it were, a time bomb under our vaunted security. Ultimately,
the ever-accelerated pace of the arms race must lead to disaster,
even if neither side consciously desires the ultimate war. That is
why the old slogans of "bargaining from strength" and "arms to
parley" and "deterring attack by the prospect of massive retaliation" have become irrelevant. A fresh approach is needed,
prompted by an awareness of the common danger, rather than by
the complacent assumption of either side that they are strong
enough to prevent an attack or to win the war if it should come.
The authors have wisely limited themselves to the task of
describing the common danger, and the irrelevance of the old
methods of staving it off by overcoming this or that deficiency in
the technology of modern weapons. They have purposely not
spelled out the details of a fresh approach. I will not presume to
suggest even the barest outline of a fresh approach, when they
have wisely refrained from doing so. I will merely observe that
such an approach must obvio~islybegin at the only place where
a sense of community has been established, across the chasm of
a great ideological and power conflict. That minimal community
has been established through the sense of an involvement in a
common predicament and peril. The reality of this minimal com-

munity is, incidentarlly, underlined by the growing differen
I m t w h the Russians,who are aware of the collimon peril,
the Chinese, w b are not.
What is implied in this study is not the proposition that
Russians can, or c8mot7be trusted; or that the defense of val
of our Western civiiiz%tion against Communist power is, or
not, a simple task. The implication is confined to the simple am-::
viction that we are involved in a race which neither we nor thy,
Russians a n win. We all have our own ideas of how to escape
the nuclear dilemma. Many of these ideas are Utopian and irr+\
vant. As one who rejects the strategy of fleeing from dif~l&,,-:
problems by taking refuge in impossible soIutions, I am the rnenthusiastic about this study which codnes itself to a clear
ation Or: the magnitude d the pmb1em and, by implicatiori, to
miticism of presendy*propmdsolutions which obscure the dim
sion d the problem.
'

Introduction

It is M c u l t for most of us to comprehend the enamity of the
revolution in military technology through which we ate now passing. During the greater part of World War 11, strategic bombing
planes carried blockbusters of TNT which weighed a little over
twenty tons. By the end of the war two atomic bombs had been
dropped upon Japan by two bombers. The power of each of these
weapons was 1,000 times greater than that of their chemical
predecessors. In less than a decade following the end of World
War I1 thermonuclear weapons were developed which multiplied the power of atomic weapons by another factor of 1,000.
Today a modem strategic bomber can carry an H-bomb which
has the destructive force of 20 million tons of TNT.
Let us represent the explosive power of a World War I1 blockbuster by a one-foot ruler. On this scale the bomb that demolished Hiroshima would be represented by the height of the
Empire State building, and a twenty-megaton weapon by the
height of the orbit of Sputnik I. One thermonuclear bomb releases
more destructive energy than that released by all of the bombs
dropped on Germany and ,Japan during World War 11. With the
development of the thermonuclear weapon man, has begun to
deal with the release of quantities of energy comparable in magnitude to the energies involved in many of the large-scale forces
of nature observed upon the earth such as hurricanes and earthquakes.
Concurrent with the revolution in the destructive power of
explosives, there has been a revolution in the speed of delivery.
The maximum speed of the major heavy bombers of World War

I1 was a little over 300 miles per hour. Modem jet long-range
bombers can travel at 650 miles per hour. But with the development of the ballistic missile it is now possible to transport thermonuclear explosives at speeds greater than 10,000 miles per hour.
In fifteen years, the transit time for a bomb flown between Mos' cow and Washington has been reduced from sixteen hours to less
than thirty minutes.
After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the belief was
widespread that war had become obsolete. The atomic bomb, it
was believed, had made war so horrible that nations would not
dare to go to war again. However, little in the history of war supported this view. Man's ability to rationalize the perpetration of
horrors upon his fellows appears to be ahnost limitless. The "open city" concept, feeble but still alive at the end of 1918, had generally been abandoned under the pressures of the relentless Blitzkriegs of the early 1940's. There were a few exceptions such as the
sparing of the holy city of Rome by both the Germans and the
Allies, but these were largely political decisions, little affected by
humanitarianism, ethics, or ideals. Art treasures and cultural artifacts were pooled with millions of human beings in the furnaces of
attrition.
The wave of revulsion that swept the world after the indiscriminate destruction of Rotterdam and the searing of Coventry was
followed by application in kind of what had been learned by the
victims about massive aerial destruction. For example, after the
most complex planning and preparation, the British wgte able to
destroy Hamburg in 1943. Over a ten-day period the German city
and 70,000 of its men, women, and children were consumed in a
cauldron of fire and high explosives-up to that time the most
catastrophic man-caused event in history. Later, mammoth efforts
to obliterate Dresden, London, and other cities were only somewhat less successful, but not for lack of diligence on the part of
the attackers. The subsequent fire-raids on Tokyo and, finally, the
atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were accommodated
as military necessity with relative ease-supported by the logic
which had earlier been developed in Europe. Yet, following the
atomic bombings of the Japanese cities, countless persons, inchid-

a

ing many who were knowledgeable and competent, were convinced that a major war fought with nuclear weapons could well
bring the end of civilization.
But the war had not been over long before military leaders had
more or less adjusted themselves to the concept of atomic war.
Far from being unthinkable, such a war, it was believed, could be
fought and won. Soon the Bikini tests were held by the U. S. Navy.
The Air Force came to believe that it had an ultimate weapon in
its hands, which it could use to impose a Pax Americana. Work
was started on developing ''small" atomic weapons to be used by
the Army for tactical purposes.
With the advent of thermonuclear weapons the belief that
war is unthinkable once again came to be widely held. Certainly, it was believed, war is really now too homble to be
fought again. An all-out nuclear war, it was said, could mean
not only the death of our civilization-it could mean the death of
mankind itself.
This belief was soon attacked.' It was argued that although allout thermonuclear war is unthinkable, there can still be small or
"limited" wars. We must do everyhng within our power to prevent a large-scale nuclear war, but military force as an instrument
of national policy is by no means obsolete. It was argued that we
must prepare ourselves for limited wars and develop, for this purpose, a variety of tactical atomic weapons. At the same time, the
concept of massive retaliation was brought forward as a deterrent
to all-out thermonuclear war. No nation, it was asserted, would
dare launch a large-scale attack were its leaders convinced that in
the process their own cities would be destroyed.
Still more recently we are asked to consider that even all-out
thermonuclear war is by no means unthinkable-provided it is
not too all-out. ~ r o ~ o n e ioft sthis view2 believe that measures can
be taken which would save the lives of many individuals in the
event of a large-scale attack. It is argued that although such a war
See, for example, H. A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,
New York : Harper and Brothers ( 1957 ) .
Notably Herman Kahn in Thermonuclear War, Princeton: Princeton University Press ( 1960).

is h o d e to contemplate, there could be a d c i m t l y large nber of survivors, and a sdciently large quantity of undamaged
consumer itnd capital goods and raw materials, to permit the
nation to rebuild its economy in a reasonable period of time-say
ten years.
If the view that it is possible for a nation to survive a large-scale
nuclear war is correct and (even more important) were large
number of persons to b e h e this view to be correct, the threat
of all-out war would continue to be an important factor govaning the relationships between nations. The extent to which tbe
possibility of war would continue to dominate international relations would depend in part upon the extent to which people
believe that survival is possible and in part upon the risks which
a nation as a whole is willing to take in order to attain a political
objective.
The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the future assuming
that the people of both East and West are willing to take substantial risks, that tbey believe that a nation can survive a large-sde
attack, and tbat'they continue to prepare themselves accordingly*
assume that they mergetidy prepare themselves to
Let us
fight limited wars using tactical nuclear weapons. What might tbe
future have in store under these circumstances?

The Arms Race
For fifteen years we have been in the largest and most frantic arms race that the world has ever known. During this period the Soviet
Union and the United States have recognized that war between
them is a possibility. Under the circumstances each nation has.
attempted to put itself in the position of winning the war should ,
it come. Actions have brought reactions, which in turn have ,:
brought new actions. Military expenditures in both nations have .
increased to staggering size. With the mobilization of scienw
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and technology, capabilities for destruction have increased explosively.
When World War I1 came to an end, the United States alone
possessed the atomic bomb. This new weapon had come into existence as quickly as it did because of the fear that Germany, with
many competent scientists and engineers available, might "get
there first."
The atomic bomb created an imbalance in military capability
which the Soviet Union was quick to appreciate. It is likely that
the discussions of the Baruch proposals failed in 1948 in large
measure because the Soviet leaders foresaw that were they to
enter into such an agreement, the imbalance in nuclear military
technology might be perpetuated.
The Russians pursued the new technology, and by 1951 they
had tested three nuclear weapons. We in turn pursued the possibility of thermonuclear devices and carried out our first test of
such a device in 1954. By 1956 our own thermonuclear bomb had
passed into the third generation, and the Russians were manufacturing their own variety.
During this period nuclear devices were not only made largerthey were made smaller as well. A variety of flexible, efficient fission bombs were developed for tactical use, and the United States
announced that it intended to utilize such weapons should a war
start. The Soviet Union followed suit.
By 1956 a revolution was taking place in the means of delivery.
In the United States the B-47 had come and gone, and the B-52
was in production. The Russians had substantial numbers of longand medium-range bombers - Badgers, Bears, and Bisons. But
even more important, a variety of missiles had entered the picture.
Soviet successes in the missile field led to the establishment of
intensive programs in the United States on the Atlas, Titan, and
Thor.
The development of a Soviet strategic bombing force led the
United States to build the DEW line, establish a radar systek in
Turkey, add a new series of fighters to the Air Defense Command,
and develop a series of missiles for air-defense purposes. The first
nuclear warhead for air-to-air rockets was tested in 1956. In 1958

the NATO sphere.
The development of Soviet ICBM's led to the use of the U-2 ;
in order to ferret out Soviet bases, to the establishment of alert
and dispersed SAC operations, and to the development of the
Polaris missile designed to be carried by the nuclear-powered
submarines.
Improved missile capabilities led to the development of earth
satellites, first launched successfully by the Russians, then by the
U.S. Realization of the vulnerability of our SAC and missile bases
to a "first strike" is now leading to the development of Atlas bases *capable of withstanding explosion pressures of twenty-five pounds ,I:
per square inch and of Titan bases capable of withstanding 100
pounds per square inch. A ballistics missile early warning system
is now being put into operation.
Today the arms race continues. Military expenditures in the
United States corresponding to about 10 per cent of our gross
national product are met by expenditures in the Soviet Union
corresponding to perhaps 25 per cent of her gross national prod- $
uct. Production of nuclear explosives continues at full speed,
and it is estimated that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. together
possess explosive material corresponding to about 30 billion
tons of TNT, or about ten tons of TNT for every inhabitant of
the world.
As the technological competition continues, it seems clear that
sometime in the mid-60's ballistic missiles will form the bulwark >q
of the striking forces of both the United States and the Soviet
Union. Bases will become increasingly hard. Guidance will become more accurate. A variety of military satellites will emerge.
Bombs, missiles, and satellites will become less expensive. But
above all we can expect in the years ahead many more "breakthroughs" which will lead to a number of startling and unexpected
military developments. Even less expensive and more efficient
methods for the destruction of large segments of life and the
products of human intelligence are almost certainly within our
grasp.
-

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Thermonuclear weapons range in explosive force up to somewhat
more than twenty megatons, corresponding to 20 million tons of
TNT. These heavy bombs can be carried by B-52 bombers. The
sizes of bombs that can be carried by missiles are at present
smaller. Minuteman and Polaris will probably be able to carry
one-megaton warheads by the mid-60's. Soviet ICBM warheads
and Atlas and Titan will probably be able to carry warheads
ranging from five to ten megatons.
When a ten-megaton warhead is detonated, roughly a third of
its total energy is released in the form of heat and light. The bomb
material and surrounding air are heated to extremely high temperatures, and the resultant fireball grows quickly to a diameter
of about three and a half miles. The heat flash persists for about
twenty seconds and on a clear day can produce third-degree
bums out to about twenty miles and second-degree burns out to
a distance of twenty-five miles from the explosion. A ten-megaton
burst in the atmosphere thirty miles above the earth could set fire
to combustibles over 5,000 square miles on a clear day.
A surface burst of a ten-megaton bomb would produce a crater
about 250 feet deep and a half mile wide. The zone of complete
demolition would be about three miles in diameter. Severe blast
damage would extend to about nine miles from the center of the
explosion, and moderate to major damage would extend out to
twelve miles, or over an area of 450 square miles.
It is likely that firestorms will result from a thermonuclear
burst over a large city. A firestorm is a huge fire in which cooler air
is drawn to the center of the burning area, elevating the temperature and perpetuating the conflagration. Winds reach hurricane
velocities. The holocaust consumes the available oxygen in the
air with the result that persons not burned to death may die of
suffocation or of carbon monoxide poisoning.
The explosion results in the instantaneous emission of nuclear
radiation in quantities that can be lethal at distances up to two

milesSbut since persons in &at area would be kind anywa

and t h m d efiects, this is not an important factor.
more dangerous i s the radiation from radioactive products
are produced in the explosion and which are scattered over
countryside as "fallout.*
More than 200 different radioactive species are formed
explosion of a thermonuclear weapon. These attach them
to the inert debris which is swept into the air by the explosion
which form the f&
mushroom cloud. The heavier
of debris fall back to earth within the first hour or so. The
prtic1es are carried downward an4 depending upon the
conditions, will be deposited over an area fifteen to thnty
wide and 100 to 500 miles long. A thermonuclear bo
ploded at low altitude deposits about 80 per cent of its
locally in this manner. The balance is injected into the stratos
and is distributed globally. About one-half of the fission d
carried into the stratosphere of the Northern Hemisphere f
earth within a year.
The local fallout from a ten-megaton explosion could, if
uniformly, produce lethal levels of radioactivity over ab
square d e s of Iand. Thus,in the absence of some protection
radiation, there could be many deaths far from the center
explosion. Indeed, in the event of a large-scale thermonu
attack and in the absence of radiation protection, far more
would d t from radiation effects than from heat or blast.

Ten Megatons on Los Angeles
In an attempt to comprehend the order of magnitude of the
of a thermonuclear explosion over a major rn
us imagine that a ten-megaton warhead is
area of downtown Los Angeles. The bomb hits during the w
ing hours of a weekday and the attack occurs sometime in the

-this last in deference to the strategic supposition that a nuclear
war will be launched only after the crops are harvested and put
underground by the attacker.
The blast effects would exterminate virtually all but the most
deeply sheltered living things within a iadius of five miles. Blast
casualties would be severe up to a distance of ten miles. But the
phenomenon that would complete the devastation of life in the
entire area would be fire. The area would be one great sea of
he, which would burn until there was nothing more to consume.
A good proportion of the metropolitan area's three-and-a-half
million cars and trucks would be lifted and thrown like grotesque
Molotov cocktails, to spew flaming gasoline, oil, and automotive
shrapnel onto and into everything in their paths. In an instant
most underground gasoline and oil tanks would rupture and explode within the blast area, and a large proporbon of the remainder within the firestorm radius would follow, each in its own
particular manner-pumps and pipes sheered and, finally, higher
and higher ambient temperatures which would soon expand, rupture, and explode the remainder.
~ e ~ o n d ' t blast
h e radius, the remaining area of Los Angeles is
occupied by relatively few first-class concrete and steel buildings;
a much greater proportion is the debris of an industrial society:
auto junk yards, lumberyards, row upon row of cheap flammable
commercial structures. But most important, this remaining area
is comprised of over 50 per cent brush-covered hills and scrub
forest. Anyone who has participated in the fighting of a ~ a k o r n i a
brush fire and who is acquainted with the remarkable explosive
nature of the oil-carrying greasewood, sumac, and scrub pine is
surprised and frightened by the volatility of the material even
when it is wet. The novel aspect of a thermonuclear codagration, however, is that most of these highly flammable materials
would break into intense flame simultaneously-a phenomenon
never before achieved either by man or by natural causes.
There are relatively few facts about large fires. Several firestorms
were produced.by the incendiary bombing of German cities, and
one such storm occurred after a fire raid on Tokyo. An atomic
bomb created a firestorm at Hiroshima, but not at Nagasaki. It

seems safe to speculate that in Los Angeles at least a twenty-fivemile radius and an unknown distance beyond it would be, within
minutes, engulfed in a suffocating firestorm that would persist for
a long time. It seems unlikely that there would be appreciable
rainfall for weeks or even months; thus, the basin fire would proceed in all directions with no interference from man or nature.
1.tseems clear that in the event of such an attack there would be
virtually no survivors of the blast and thermal effects, with the
possible exception of a few persons who had made elaborate preparations for surviving the catastrophe. Their shelters would have
to be very deep and provided with a built-in oxygen supply and
cooling system. Unless they were a b k to maintain themselves in
such a shelter for many weeks, their chances of making their way
to relative safety would be slim.
A major problem would be trying to get through ankle-high to
knee-high ash containing numerous hidden pitfalls; clambering for
dozens of miles over huge, smoking piles of radioactive rubble,
burned-out timber, wire, and steel. If the survivor made it to the
edge of the devastated area, he in all probability would have accumulated by that time a fatal dose of radiation which would shortly
claim what was left of his life.
Although the Los Angeles situation is an extreme one, the vulnerability of other major metropolitan areas differs only in degree.
If firestorms are indeed the rule rather than the exception, as
seems likely in view of the huge quantities of flammable materid
that exist in all cities, we can expect the survivors of a direct hit
by a thermonuclear bomb to be few in number. Civil defense preparations in our major metropolitan areas would appear, under the
circumstances, to make sense only if we were willing to rebuild
those areas to provide for deep, extensive, and sealed underground
quarters. An alternative would be to provide for rapid mass evacuation to the countryside, where shelters need only protect
against the fallout. But the time for such evacuation following
warning of an impending attack by missiles would be so short that
the technological problems involved in moving the people would
appear to be considerably greater than those involved in providing
deep underground shelters.

In any event, it is evident that individual metropolitan areas
are extremely vulnerable to thermonuclear attack. It is also clear
that any program designed to decrease the .vulnerability of these
areas would be difiicuIt to put into effect and extremely expensive.
Rationally, were we to make vigorous efforts to survive a largescale nuclear war, we would forget about our existing cities, reconcile ourselves to the loss of their inhabitants, and concentrate our
efforts in other areas.

Twenty Thousand Megatons
on the United States
It is not possible to predict with any accuracy what the physical
and biological effects of an all-out nuclear war upon the United
States would be. At one extreme it could result in the total annihilation of our people and our cities. At the other extreme our cities
might be spared, and deaths might be relatively few. All gradations in between are possible. The actual effects would depend
upon a multiplicity of factors including the time at which the war
starts, the nature of the weapons systems then in effect, and the
nature of defenses.
Were the United States to become involved in a thermonuclear
war today, the primary targets would probably be the Air Force
bases from which we might retaliate, together with certain other
military installations. Assuming that the Soviet missiles wete
guided with reasonable accuracy, these bases could be destroyed
quickly with a relatively small number of bombs. Under the circumstances, threats of massive retaliation could be carried out
only by those of our planes and missiles that were in the air at
,the time of attack-conceivably a very small number. With our
bases destroyed we would be helpless. The Soviet Union could
threaten to destroy our cities unless we capitulated. Thus, the war
would be over without the loss of any of our major cities. The lives

lost would be those involved with our military installations here
and abroad and in adjacent cities and towns where fallout could
claim many victims.
In the continental United States about 130 Air Force and other
military installations might be,the targets of such an attack, and
perhaps 500 to 1OOO megatons would be dropped. Optimistically,
as few as 10 million deaths would result were the attack to take
place today. More likely, there would be about 20 million deaths,
largely because of the proximity of many important Air Force and
other military installations to population centers.
Thus, any thermonuclear attack upon the United States @at
would make sense from a military point of view would involve a
minimum of something over 100 delivered bombs totaling about
500 or more megatons in energy. There are good reasons to suppose that an actual attack would be considerably larger than this.
It is M c u l t to imagine the emergence of a situation other than
accident that would result in a smaller attack. A major decrease in
the number of key military installations in the continental United
States could bring about such a situation, but in spite of' the development of the Polaris submarine there is little evidence that this
will happen. Let us focus our attention, then, upon attacks larger
than 5OO megatons.
In 1959 the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy attempted to provide a picture of the effect upon the United States of a 1500megaton attack-about three times larger than the "minimum" attack described above. The Committee took testimony from a number of experts concerning the effects of a simultaneous attack
upon 224 centers, about half of them military. The data presented
indicated that were the attack to take place today nearly 25 million deaths could be expected the &st day and an additional 25
million persons would be fatally injured. An additional 20 million
persons would be injured, but not fatally. Nearly 75 per cent of
the deaths would have resulted from the immediate effects of the
explosions and 25 per cent would have resulted from fallout. More
than half of the surviving injured would have d e r e d radiation
injuries.
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It should be emphasized, however, that these estimates of casualties are minimal, for they include only the estimates of casualties resulting from blast, direct t h e d effects, and radiation. The
estimates do not include casualties resulting from such secondary
effects as the disorganization of society, a disruption of communications, massive fires, extiaction of livestock, spread of disease,
genetic damage, or the ingestion of radioactive materials.
In the attack visualized, about 12 million dwellings would have
sdered blast damage to the extent that they would not be salvageable. An additional 9 million dwellings would have suffered
some blast damage. Almost half the dwellings in the United States
would have been either severely damaged or contaminated by fallout to the extent that they would not be usable for at least several
months after the attack. Estimates were not given for secondary
fire damage to structures. This could exceed by a considerable
margin the damage resulting from blast.
Thus we could expect that a 1500-megaton attack, were it to
take place today, would result in the death or injury of at least
one-third of our population. It has been pointed out that with the
provision of appropriate shelter protection the number of casualties could be greatly reduced. At the same time we must recognize that attacks considerably larger than 1500 megatons are technically feasible. Indeed, in our present state of unpreparedness for
a thermonuclear war, it is now possible in principle for an enemy
virtually to annihilate our population. One may argue legitimately
whether the annihilation of our population would serve any useful
purpose to any enemy. -Butthe fact that it is possible in principle
for another power to achieve such a result warrants a discussion
of the possibility.
Were it not for the fact that a substantial fraction of our country is, at all times, covered with clouds, an enemy could completely
scorch our earth by exploding about 600 ten-megaton bombs,
evenly spaced, at an altitude of about thmty miles. On a clear day
forests, grasslands, and crops would ignite or wither, as would
the flammable structure of the cities, towns, and villages. All
exposed living creatures, except those living in the water, would
perish. A substantial fraction of the human beings who were pro-

t h d blacaust. Others would perish as the r d t of such
ondary dkts of 'the catastrophe as lack of food and adequate
medical care.

.

Foa~natdyat any one time clouds protect about 50 per am&
of the nation, but such a technique could readily be applied to the:
clear areas. The cloud situatian at any given time could be detarP;
mined by observation from satellites of the Tiros type. M&&B
guidance mula be relatively crudeerrors of ten miles d d bq
easily tolerated.
An attempt to annihilate the population with fallout w
&
require more explosive per unit grea than would the t h d ;
approach, but in the absence of protective shelters the quantitt~
involved would by no means be prohibitive. In our present u n F
pared state a 20,Ooemegaton attack using bombs with a twa- -:
thirds fission yield designed to maximize deaths would rest&
in the death from fallout within sixty days after the attack BE 'I
virtually everyane who had survived the initial afects of blast a d
heat.
It seems likely that in our present state we
as a nation, unable to recover, by an att~ckconsiderably
20,000 megatons: We do not know the maximum damage that
oouM be tolerated by tbe United States and that would permit .
the m C v mto rebuild the' economy. However, one can conceim
of an attack, considering all major direct and indirect effects, ,
which would result & virtual adhilation of our
villages, forests, and farmlands. Such an attack would consist-ofe
suitablemixtureof bombs exploded at high altitude to make
imum use of thermal effects (2,000to 3,000 mt ),of d a c e
designed to destroy military bases and the major urban
( 1,500 to 3,000 mt ), and bombs exploded
of fallout in areas which are not damaged by
first two categories ( 1,500 to 4,000 mt ) .
It seems likely that we have rack?& or will soon reach, the
point where an attack of this size muld be mounted against.
from'the point of view of the nuclear explosives required. It
improbable that systems for the efficient del
*

,
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ties of explosives will be available in the very near future, but
the revolution in delivery systems may well bring the Soviet
Union to that point in a few years.

Deterrence and Stability
The United States is at present apparently committed to a
policy of not striking the first blow in an all-out nuclear war. Even
were this not our strong moral position, in the situation toward
which we are heading it would be a strong practical position. It
is doubtful that we will know accurately the geographic locations
of most Soviet ICBM sites. Were the United States, in a first strike,
to destroy only a fraction of the Soviet missile bases, those remaining could be launched to create a devastating retaliatory attack.
It is widely recognized that the Soviet Union could have an
enormous advantage in launching a first strike against the United
States. Committed as she is to a policy of not striking first, the
United States has attempted to build up a deterrent force, or
second-strike capability, which is aimed primarily at the large
cities and industrial complexes of the Soviet Union. In theory, so
long as the Soviet leaders believe that the major Russian cities
would be utterly destroyed in the event of a strike against the
United States, they would not dare launch the attack.
In the days when both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relied upon
delivery by airplanes, when warning times were relatively long,
threats of massive retaliation from our SAC bases could be believable to the Russians and, depending upon the amount of damage
the Soviet leaders were willing to sustain, could be effective. But
the rapid upsurge in Soviet missile capabilities is creating a situation in which the threat of massive reprisal by the U.S. is rapidly
losing credence.
The mainstay of our retaliatory force has consisted of strategic
bombers located at SAC bases in various parts of the world. With
the arrival of the missile age, in which warning times are short,

those bases are quickly becoming extremely vulnerable to attack.
The United States is being forced to consider extreme stop-gap
measures, such as the airborne alert, to protect its manned bomber
capability. It is also engaging in crash programs designed to narrow the deterrent gap. Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic
missiles are being built to be fired from hardened bases within our
borders. The Polaris system, in which missiles are fired from longrange nuclear-powered submarines, is being urgently developed.
It would appear that the United States is entering a period of
several years during which our strategic force will not in itself be
an effective deterrent to a first strike by the soviet Union. During
this period, if war does not break out, factors other than relative
deterrence capabilities will have played a major role in its prevention. These factors may range from the strong desires of the leaders of both East and West for peace to a conviction on the part of
Soviet leaders that the U.S.S.R. ,can attain its political and economic objectives without recourse to violence.
If we pass through the current critical period without war, then
the fulfillment of our current major goals, coupled with Soviet
reactions to our actions, will probably give rise to a situation in
which both the Soviet Union and the United States possess powerful and invulnerable retaliatory missile forces. Some of these will
be of the Polaris type. Others will be mobile and land-based. Still
others will be underground in fixed locations.
A number of knowledgeable persons are looking forward to the
When neither nation can destroy
establishment of such sy~terns.~
the other's retaliatory force in a first strike, it is believed that there
will be no first strike. Such a system is often looked upon as being a
"stable" one-as distinct from the situation in which we are now
involved.
In view of the fact that the combination of technology and
international politics is leading us rapidly to the development of
relatively invulnerable retaliatory systems, it is important that we
examine factors which affect their stability. Can they really be
stable? If they can, then in effect technology will have eliminated
3 See, for example, Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National D e f m e ,
New York: Random House ( 1959).

large-scale war from the world scene. Or is such a system basically
unstable? If it is, and if we follow this path to its end, it is likely
that we will perish.

The Spread of
Nuclear Military Technology
In thinking of deterent systems, we usually think in terms of the
two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet
nuclear technology-and in particular nuclear military technology
-is spreading. England conducted nuclear tests several years ago.
More recently, France tested her first nuclear device. It is probable
that nuclear military technology will spread to a number of additional nations in the course of the next twenty years.
A recent study4 indicates that eleva additional countries are
technically and economically able to embark on successful nuclear
weapons programs: Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Most of these nations are highly industrialized and
either have operating reactors or arrangements for obtaining
them.
Eight countries are cited as being capable economically, although more limited in technical competence and in scientific
manpower than the countries in the first group. These include
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands,
Poland, and Yugoslavia.
An additional six countries are viewed as probably being economically capable, although being appreciably more limited in
industrial resources and scientific manpower: Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Norway, Spain, and the Union of South Africa. It is diffiI

Davidon, M. Kalkstein, and C. Hohenemser, The N-th County Problem and Anns Control, Washington: National Planning Association (1960).
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cult to see now any of these countries could achieve a successful
nuclear weapons program within the next five years.
But when we view the situation from the point of view of the
requisite capabilities, in principle there could readily be Ween
nations producing nuclear arms within a decade. Within twenty
years nearly thirty nations could be in the nuclear bomb business.
Quite apart from their achieving independent nuclear military
capabilities, nuclear arms will almost surely spread to other nations
as the result of military alliances. Although the United States
exerts nominal controls over all of its nuclear weapons, it has in
effect placed them in the hands of its NATO allies. It is possible
that the Soviet Union will eventually place weapons in the hands
of certain of its allies such as China and North Korea and conceivable that she might later place such weapons in the hands of certain nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia.
It is not at all unlikely that nuclear explosive devices, and the
ingredients for making them, will eventually enter into international commerce. This will be particularly true if such devices
are used on any appreciable scale for peaceful pursuits such as
earth-moving.
Nuclear weapons are rapidly becoming less complicated, less
expensive, &d easier to manufacture. They are by all odds the least
expensive means of killing and destroying. They can give smaller
nations power for waging war which is out of all proportion to
their true industrial power. Given such weapons, Cuba in principle could threaten the United States, or Turkey could threaten
the Soviet Union-to be sure, not enough to annihilate, but enough
to cause really serious trouble. For these reasons the pressures
leading to the spread of nuclear weapons and of nuclear military
technology appear to be too strong to be overcome in the absence
of a forceful agreement between the present nuclear powers.
There is no substantial evidence that this will occur.
A nuclear weapon, to be effective, must be delivered to a target.
The complexities of long-range missiles are such that lags in missile technology will hinder the development of effective nuclear
weapons systems in many countries. Shorter-range missiles, how-

ever, are less complex and are more likely to enter into international commerce. But even the longer-range missiles are becoming
less complex and less expensive, and it may well be that missile
technology will spread about as rapidly as nuclear technology.
It seems likely that this will be true for China, the most threatening
of the pre-industrial powers. In addition, there are other delivery
systems which could be used; the submarine, for example, or more
pedestrian methods-the sabotaging ship or the planted" valiseor more ingenious methods which cost little or nothing.
The spread of nuclear military capabilities will almost certainly
decrease the stability of deterrent systems. The greater the number of nations that possess the capability of launching a nuclear
strike, the greater the probability that there will be a strike.
The spread of nuclear military technology will greatly increase
the complexity of deterrent systems. Thus, when China becomes
a nuclear and missile power, or when we believe that she has become one, we must train our missiles upon the bases and cities of
that country as well as upon those of the Soviet Union. And the
Soviet Union will undoubtedly feel it necessary to deter China
as well. In any event, as nation after nation arms-China, Japan,
East Germany, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Spain, Argentina-we
must make decisions as to whether or not we must establish systems to deter them. Are they potential enemies or friends? To what
extent can they be trusted?

Accidental and Catalytic War
Even with only two nuclear powers and four nuclear nations in
the world, there is a finite chance that an all-out nuclear war
could be triggered accidentally. This could be brought about as
the result of either mechanical or human failure. No machine is
perfect. No human being is free from the possibility of making
errors of judgment. Already, for example, there have been several
accidents involving American aircraft carrying nuclear bombs.
I

One can conceive of a number of ways in which a nuclear' war
might start accidentally. Radar evidence might be misinterpreted,
and under the misconception that an -attack had been launched
by one .country a retaliatory attack might be launched by the
other. ~e&mnaissanceflights carried out by one nation over or
near the territory of another might be construed as a m of war
and might lead to the launching of a &st strike against air or
missile bases. An American pilot might, as a result of strain during
a period of tension, bomb a Soviet city. The reverse situation is
also conceivable - and were New York suddenly demolished,
there is little question that with our present organization and
philosophy we would retaliate quickly and vigorously. When we
are fully in the age of missiles we must reckon particularly with
the possibility of serious accident, largely bedause the time for
decision will be so short.
We are not far distant from the time when we will use satellites
on a large scale for reconnaissance purposes, for communications,
and as carriers of weapons. The use of such satellites might be
interpreted as acts of war, as might efforts on the part of a
potential enemy to destroy them. Such satellites could be used to
jam radio communications over another nation's territory, and
this in itself might appear to justdy the launching of an attack.
Intensive submarine activity can lead to accident. Misinterpretation of the identity or intentions of an unknown underwater
vehicle could lead to unwarranted action on our part. Failure of
submarine communications with- home base could result in the
premature firing of her missiles.
We must worry also about "administrative accidents''-that is,
about military decisions to launch attacks that are not adequately
approved by higher authorities. Not long ago a Tunisian village
was bombed by the French military without the prior consent or
knowledge of the French government. It is conceivable that
military officials in the U.S.or the U.S.S.R. might bring about a
coup and order an attack of their own without adequate approval.
Recently the House of Commons heard a difficult question addressed to the Prime Minister: What guarantees could be brought
forward that would assure that no more "overflights" out of

British bases would be made? The ensuing discussion revolved on
the possibility of this sort of action being undertaken by the
American military without the knowledge of either the British
or the American governments.
Clearly no such assurance can be given. The possibilities of
military action ( not necessarily of the button-pushing kinds )
being undertaken en camera by a small group of officers, either
American or Russian, grows as the number of ways in which
politicians7ultimatums can be violated increases. As crisis compounds crisis, from Cuba to the Congo, the probability of misjudgment, accident, or precipitous military action is vastly
increased.
Nor can this situation, unstable as it is, become anything but
worse so long as violence provides the means for enforcement
of the traditional diplomatic chalkJine: "This far and no farther!"
The answer to the English is obvious: "We hope to exercise
nominal field control over American and NATO military units,
both our tactical forces and such activities as aerial espionage,
but we have no means at hand or in sight to guarantee such control. The only temporary encouragement we can offer is that
there seems to be a deterrent balance which renders the execution
of the threats against you improbable. But we do not know at
what point the U.S.S.R. will decide that the military margin is
sufficiently in her favor to warrant the risks involved in carrying
out these threats."
What we cannot bring ourselves to say openly in this hypothetical reply is: As the Russian military position becomes more
clearly dominant in the next decade, and as increasing psychological pressure is brought to bear on the Western positions
everywhere, the likelihood of desperate, erratic, unauthorized
action by U.S.and Allied forces is much greater than the chance
of similar breaches of discipline by the Soviets. For one thing,
the Soviet political and military policies are one policy, responsive
only to the master plan of action-whatever it may be. For another, the Soviets have a polished method at hand for "violation
by proxy," the calculated use of dominated or threatened powers
to perform acts of belligerence which the U.S.S.R. may disclaim.

The U.S.-NATO alliance, on the other hand, is hampered operationally by political differences, exposure inequities, geographic
awkwardness which complicates logistic and communication problems, and, to some extent, language difficulties.
Thus, if things continue the way they are going, the possibility
of a coup by the United States military is real. The general assumption that the American soldier is automatically responsive
to his civilim'masters might be rudely shaken were there a serious
and clearly visible retreat on the world front by the American
policy-makers. The same might be true in the event of a disarmament agreement which the military does not consider fool-proof.
In addition to accident, it is possible that the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. can become involved in a war which neither nation
wants as the result of the catalytic action of a third nation. For
example, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco
might suddenly be destroyed by thermonuclear weapons launched
from submarines. The submarines themselves might not be identifiable, but we might with good reason suspect them to be from
the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances we might launch a
devastating attack upon that country, not realizing that a third
country (China? Japan? Argentina?), rather than the Soviet
Union, had attacked us.

Limited War
Given a stable deterrent system, it is widely believed in the United
States that we can engage in small or rimited" wars without
serious danger that large-scale nuclear weapons systems will be
brought into use. It is even visualized that such wars can be
fought utilizing "tactical" nuclear weapons ranging in size from
a few hundred tons to perhaps 100,000 tons of TNT equivalent.
About a decade ago the United States announced that it was
embarking upon a program of developing nuclear weapons for
tactical use by ground forces. By making use of the enormous

energy available in nuclear weapons, it was hoped to neutralize
to some extent Soviet superiority in armed manpower.
Following development of nuclear weapons for use by ground
troops, the Soviet Union developed similar weapons. Our relative
gains, thus far, do not appear to be very great. Indeed, with
tactical nuclear weapons in the possession of both sides, savings
in manpower turn out to be non-existent. The major change in
the nature of ground warfare resulting from tactical nuclear
weapons appears to be that it will almost certainly be more
destructive of property than ground warfare of either World
War I1 or Korean vintage.
Thus far, nuclear weapons have not been used by troops in war.
However, there is every reason to expect that they will be used
in a war in which ground forces are used, for we have built up
our own forces around such weapons. As our forces are at present
organized, it would be difficult for us to fight a limited ground
war of any appreciable size without using nuclear weapons.
Were the United States to become involved in a limited war,
in Western Europe for example, in which nuclear weapons were
used, but in which it was the express wish of the participants to
avoid using their all-out retaliatory forces, there would nevertheless be serious danger that the relatively small war would
"escalate" into a large one. Ten-kiloton weapons, although considerably less destructive than those of the megaton variety, can
nevertheless be used to destroy towns and cities on a massive
scale. As the scale of the destruction increases, one side may deem
it desirable to carry the war to the enemies' retaliatory forces and
cities. Or the retaliatory forces could be brought into operation
as the result of one side's stepping over an arbitrary line of demarcation specified by the enemy-a city, a national boundary,
the energy of an explosion.
In any event, it is difficult to visualize techniques of truly
stabilizing limited wars in which nuclear weapons are used. Any
limitation on size of explosive would be quite arbitrary and difficult to monitor. Although it is conceivable that a small nuclear war
could be kept from escalating, the probability would be high that
sooner or later it would turn into an all-out war.

If tactical nuclear weapons were to be' outlawed in war, the
situation would appear to be less unstable. Nevertheless, even in
a war fought with conventional weapons, there would be serious
danger that it too would grow to the point where the retaliatory
systems would be triggered. Further, although it is conceivable
that nuclear weapons might be outlawed from use in the field, it
would nevertheless be necessary for armies to prepare to fight
with them-in other words, to prepare to fight two quite different
types of war. Even were such weapons outlawed, the knowledge
for manufacturing and using them would remain. There would,
as a result, be serious danger that one side might attempt to put
them into use, taking advantage of the unprepared state of the
other side.
In this connection, we should recognize the likelihood that any
future war that is of appreciable size will involve the use of
nuclear weapons at some stage, no matter what disarmament
controls have been in existence prior to the outbreak of the war.
Even were the nations of the world to cany out successfully a
program of total nuclear disarmament, including the elimination
of long-range missiles, the knowledge needed to manufacture such
weapons would remain. Once a "conventional" war broke out,
there would almost certainly be a frantic race upon the part of the
participants to manufacture the weapons once again. Each of
the antagonists would realize that the first nation to produce
megaton nuclear weapons in quantity, together with the means of
delivering them, would have the opposing side at its mercy.

Factors Preventing Agreement
on Arms Control and Disarmament
On the basis of the considerations thus far discussed, it is amply
clear that the world is in great danger for as long as the arms race
continues and the giant retaliatory systems remain in place, ready

for use. It would appear to be obvious that major steps must be
taken aimed at eliminating the retaliatory systems and bringing
the arms race under control. In other words, the situation warrants
agreements between the nuclear powers aimed at instituting a
considerable measure of disarmament with inspections and controls, slowing the rate of spread of nuclear military technology,
and breaking the vicious research and development circle that
helps perpetuate the arms race. In spite of the overwhelming need
for such agreements, however, there does not appear to be much
chance that adequate steps will be taken in the near future.
There are few people in America today who care to be identified
with a belligerent militaristic policy which is likely to lead to war.
It is generally recognized that the time is past when talk of
"preventive" war could be rationalized. Yet the war machine
gathers strength, and serious consideration of its diminution or
dismantling is rare and often timid. Aside from the difficulties
involved in the Realpolitik of the international situation, there are
domestic forces, largely unspoken, that commit us more absolutely
each day to the path away from effective arms control-not to speak
of actual disarmament.
There are many knowledgeable persons who believe that under
no circumstances should research and development on new
weapons systems be stopped. There would always be the fear that
the potential enemy might develop a greatly superior system of
offense or defense which would give him a considerable advantage. The only way of minimizing the danger of such a threat is to
maintain a diversity of research and development covering all
major aspects of military technology. Since individual nations
stopping development programs on weapons syscannot jus*
tems, it is clear that the tug-of-war in this area is likely to continue
-that new offensive systems will continue to replace old ones
and that these in turn will necessitate new defensive systems. As
the research and development continue, there will be new breakthroughs which will make possible still newer systems and render
older ones obsolete.
Persons who insist upon perpetuating the military research and
development race have an impressive argument when they point

to the development of the thermonuclear bomb. Following World
War 11, strong forces in our government, particularly in the
scientific community, discouraged the establishment of a research
and development program aimed at producing megaton weapons.
Many factors were involved in this attitude-some of them practical, others emotional and moral. There were others, however, who
believed just as strongly that our lack of effort in this direction
could be suicidal. What if the Russians were to develop such
weapons first? Would they hesitate to make use of their new-found
strategic advantage?
The pro-hydrogen bomb forces eventually won out, and a
vigorous program was established, which was successful in a
spectacularly short time. The Russians, of course, established their
own program, which was also successful.
Today the proponents of maintaining extremely strong programs
in the development of weapons systems can point to much more
than the hydrogen bomb as justification for their views. The
rapidly increasing deterrent gap has resulted in large measure
from our not financing missile development adequately. The Polaris
development, had it come earlier, would have done much to relieve
the situation.
Thus, no matter what is possible it must be pursued. Can gigaton
bombs be built? We must do the work and see. Can climate over
the Soviet Union be altered? We must experiment. Can the
earth be burned, broken, kept from rotating? Can the albedo be
increased? Can all life be eliminated? Can we make the oceans
boil? All of these questions must be considered. If we don't consider
them, the Russians might, and if successful they would have us
at a disadvantage.
Most persons who view the arms race with alarm and feel that
something can be done about it believe that nuclear test suspension
with inspection and controls represents a reasonable first step
which can lead to a more widely-based system of arms control
and disarmament. It would stop nuclear weapons development at
the present stage; it would establish a precedent for other arms
control arrangements; it would slow the spread of nuclear military
technology to other areas of the world.
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Opponents of nuclear test suspension do so in part on the
grounds that research and development in this area would effectively be halted (it is difficult to design new products and systems
without testing them). There are many new areas which the
research and development-minded persons would like to explore:
new tactical weapons, anti-missile defense, communications jamming the effects of tremendous explosions outside the earth's
atmosphere, improved efticiency of megaton weapons so that the
very largest could be carried by ICBM's.
When it is pointed out that Russian resekch in these areas
would be curtailed also, it is usually suggested that the Russians
might carry out a clandestine testing program. It is also suggested
the Russians might already be ahead of us in some of these areas.
Opponents of nuclear test suspension correctly point out that no
system of inspection and controls can be 100 per cent effective.
No matter how elaborate the system might be, there would always
be a chance (although perhaps very small) that a particular
clandestine explosion might go undetected. This argument is used
effectively with many persons who take the view that if there is
m y possibility of cheating we should not enter into an agreement.
This same argument can be used effectively against test bans in
any military area. For example, although missile tests could be
monitored very effectively, it would always be possible in principle
for a test to be undertaken secretly. Technical systems of monitoring and inspecting, like massive retaliatory systems, are fallible.
In our modem technological world there can be no such thing as
100 per cent security-like infinity, it can be approached but never
reached.
Although the probability of detecting clandestine tests can never
be increased to 100per cent, it can be increased substantially given
adequate research and development in this area. Thus far, however, the responsibility for research and development in the nuclear
test detection area has been placed in the hands of those groups
that are most opposed to test cessation: the Air Force and the
Atomic Energy Commission.
The foregoing illustrates the effectiveness of the alliance, which
is still young, between the scientist-technicianon the one hand and

the military on the other. Tens of thousands of scientists and technicians have devoted aU of their professional lives to the invention
and construction of weapons. A majority of those who went to
work after Wmld War I1 are convinced that weaponry is a way of
life for themselves and expect the U.S.-Soviet contest to continue
forever. Many of them are-artidate and highly valued consultants
in every walls of American life, from the Congressional committee
to the P.T.A.
Although-these men are not generally openly political, they are
in every sense the paramilitary-civilian soldiers. They have spent
most of their adult lives in the direct or secondary employment of
one or another of the services, and their sympathy for &d concurrence with their uniformed colleagues are often marked and
open. Should a showdown between the military and the civilian
sectors occur, this group could be relied upon to staunchly back
the handlers of the weapons they have so devotedly evolved.
. The military leaders themselves are quite naturally not enthusiastic for disarmament or for any steps that might curtail the freedom of action of the armed services. These is rather clearly a
military elite emerging in the United Stat& which is dedicated to
a position of perpetual hostility toward the Soviet Union and which
wields enormous political as &ell as military power.
A small but not negligible fraction of the $40 billion defense
budget is invested judiciously each year in a wellconceived program of public and Congressional -relations. As a result, the
military lobby is now the strongest lobby in Washington. Were
the State Department to negotiate successfully an arms control
agreement with the Soviet Union and were the armed services
united in their opposition to the agreement, the agreement would
almost certainly be defeated by the Senate. There is little doubt
that the armed services exert more control over Congress than
that body exerts over the Defense Department. Indeed, the
military elite is clearly in a position to assume actual political
command over the U.S. striking forces if there are serious signs
of u~eakness"in U.S. foreign relations.
Among the deadly myths that tend to support the argument
for retention and expansion of the arms race, the least examined,

but nonetheless powerful and inhibiting, are those revolving on
our dependence on the war economy. The primary apprehension
about the reduction of the weapons budget is based on a single,
simple statistic-the $40-50 billion defens&%udgetis a 10-12 per
cent segment of the gross national product. But, as Gerard Pie1
points out: one must adjust to the "investment multiplier" to
determine the real derivative economic activity generated and
sustained by the weapons business. This arithmeticaL device
suggests that between one-quarter and one-third of the economic
activity of the nation as a whole is based upon the weapons race.
The primary war equipage business supports a host of dependent
enterprises which are nominally "civilian" in nature.
The first statistic, the 10-12 per cent, is the more widely used
because it is the easier to amornodate. The argument for the
relative unimportance of the war economy goes this way: The
GNP is slated to accelerate at about 5 per cent per year. If we can
hold war expenditures to their present doRw level, then obviously
the proportion of the national income spent on "defense" would decrease each year. There are two assumptions here, and both of
them are slippery. First, there is no assurance that the kind of
economic faltering encountered in 1958,the year of the still largely
unexplained "recession," cannot and will not be repeated with
greater or lesser intensity and for unforeseeable periods. Second,
the dollar demands of the arms race are flatly unpredictable from
month to month.
If the expenditure on weapons systems increases during the
next five years at the same rate as it has during the last five, even
allowing the 5 per cent annual GNP increase, the use of the
Keynesian multiplier would indicate that close to 50 per cent of the
total of U.S. production and business in 1965 may be directly or'
indirectly war goods aqd s e ~ c e s .
At what point will this kind of economic dependence become
so crucial that it cannot be substantially reduced without grave
harm to the basic economic structure? It may well be that the
time has already come.
SGerard Piel, ' m e Economics of Disarmament," B W n of the Atomic
Scientlrts (April, 1980).

The elements and conditiom reinforcing the war economy are
many. Real, justified fear of the mysterious Soviet juggernaut is
held by most of the people in one way or another. Substantial disarmament now, or at any foreseeable time ahead, seems emotionally (and, therefore, practically) impossible. On the contrary,
the psychology of fear promises to increase to the point where
substantial personal economic sacrifices cuuld be asked of the
people-and given willingly, if the alternative parades as military
vulnerability. Even a full-scale depression would undoubtedly be
largely b l d d on Soviet actions and pressures. It is conceivable
that the public reaction would be similar to that displayed after
Pearl Harbor. The butter is more likely to disappear than the guns.

THE NEXT PHASE OF THE ARMS RACE:

Defense and Recovery
in a Thermonuclear War
We have seen that our prospects of securing agreements upon
disarmament and arms control are poor when viewed domestically.
When viewed internationally (How far will Russia be willing to
go? What is her conception of our intentions? What about China?)
the prospects appear to be even more remote.
We have also seen that if the arms race continues at its present
pace, the probability of war is very high. What, then, are our
prospects? If war indeed approaches the inevitable, we should
inquire into means for minimizing its impact upon us. Can we
defend ourselves? Can we recover?
In connection with our military position, it is clear that an offense
has enormous advantage over even the most active defense. Undoubtedly in the years ahead there will be considerable progress
in the development of anti-missile missiles. But it is doubtful that
we will ever be able to destroy more than a small fraction of the
missiles headed toward our military installations and cities.

An obvious defense measure, which in principle could be made
&edive as desired, would be to protect the people and their
cities from the effects of nuclear weapons. Relatively simple
shelters, it is alleged, can protect people outside the areas of blast
from the effects of fallout. Very deep and elaborate underground
shelters can protect people from the primary and secondary
thermal effects. Relatively primitive underground storage shelters
can protect stocks of food, equipment, and raw materials.
We saw in an earlier section that a 1,500-megaton attack upon
the United States today would result in about 60 million casualties.
The installation of fallout shelters in the afeas outside the major
cities would decrease the number of immediate casualties considerably. Installation of shelters to protect against blast and
thermal effects might decrease the casualties to about 5 million.
Were all business activities (except farming) and all residences
moved very deeply underground, casualties could be reduced
dramatically.
It is =cult to estimatethe extent of the damage and the number
of casualties which we could support in the United States and still
recover from the effects of the blow. A great deal would depend
upon the extent of the preparations which had been made. A great
deal would depend upon the true vulnerability of modem industrial society to disruption.
The Soviet Union lost about 20 million persons (about 10 per
cent of her population) during World War I1 and recovered
rapidly-but the losses were sustained over a period of several
years. Kahn6 has estimated that with rather modest preparations
we could sustain a sudden loss of at least 20 million persons and
rebuild our economy in about ten years. This estimate makes some
assumptions concerning the vulnerability of the industrialeconomic organism which may not be true. It assumes, for example,
that the major metropolitan areas and the areas of lower population density are relatively independent of each other and that the
economy could be rebuilt by the latter were the former totally
destroyed. It assumes that people will behave rationally following
the attack. It ignores the effect of shock. It minimizes the sensi6 Herman

Kahn, op. cit.

Wty to disruption of the complex network of mines, farms,
factories, distribution centers, tramportation facilities, and commwlrication systems.
The question of whether or not a nation can recover from a
nuclear attack of a given magnitude cannot be answered easily,
for it involves a multiphcity of interlocking factors, some physical
and others human. One can debate the question endlessly, and
in the long run one would not know for certain until the great
test was made.
In the light of our best estimates of current Soviet offensive
capabilities, were an all-out attack to be made upon us today,
recovery might be possible. Again, this question is debatable.
Were the attack to take place in another five years, and were we
to make no preparations, recovery would be extremely dubious.
Presiunably preparation could expedite recovery from such an
attack. For this reason we can expect great emphasis to be placed
during the next few years on programs aimed at decreasing the
vulnerability of our population and expediting post-attack recovery. The next phase of the "arms race" will almost certainly involve
great emphasis upon the area of civilian defense.
If the arms race continues, as it probably will, its future pattern
seems clear in broad outline. As a result of the emergence of the
current tremendous capabilities for killing and destroying, programs will be started aimed at the evacuation of cities, the construction of fallout shelters in regions outside the major metropolitan areas, and the construction of limited underground shelters.
Increased offensive capabilities will then emerge which will to
some extent neutralize these efforts. Larger bombs will be compressed into sufficiently small packages to be carried by ICBM's.
Very large bombs (about 1,000 megatons) will be built which,
when exploded at an altitude of about 300 miles, could sear six
Western states.
The new developments will cause people to burrow more deeply
into the ground. Factories will be built in caves, as will apartment
houses and stores. Eventually most human life will be underground, confronted by arsenals capable of destroying all life over
the land areas of the earth. Deep under the ground people will be

safe-at least until such time as we learn how to make
explosives capable of pulverizing the earth to great depths.
5 .The arms race and the associated uprooting of established in:.stitutions will outstrip by far the spiral of upheaval described
.-by Wang Chi during the war which preceded the 'Pang dynasty:
"These days, continually fuddled with drink
I fail to satisfy the appetites of the sod.
But seeing men a11 behaving like drunkads,
How can I alone remain sober?"
The Soviet Union has apparently, in the last few years, instituted
a civilian defense program of substantial magnitude. It is probable
that within the next two or three years the United States will
embark on a crash shelter program for a large proportion of its
citizens and some of its industry. Once the shelter program is
underway, it will constitute a s i e c a n t retreat from the idea of
the obsolescence of war.
Once the e p l e are convinced that they can survive the present
1state of the art of killing,a broad and significant new habit pattern
will have been introduced and accepted, one grotesquely different
from any we have known for thousands of years-that of adjusting
ourselves to the idea of living in holes. From that time onward
it will be simple to adjust ourselves to living in deeper holes.
Tens of thousands of years ago our Mowterian and Aurignacian
ancestors lived in caves. The vast knowledge which we have
accumulated during the intervening millenia will have brought us
full cycle. The epic of man's journey upward into the light will
have ended.

E
<

Is War Obsolete?
Men have engaged in acts of war for unknown millenia. It is now
often stated that the new techniques of war have rendered the
war systSm obsolete-that war and the threat of war is no longer a
useful extension of diplomacy. That this will eventually be true is

questiuqable. If the pnrrs race eantInues and if man survives
that raw, it will eventually end as a gobsqye stalemate involving
weepons of such emmous destructiveness that they simply cannot
.be d - n o r can their use be &ectively threatened.
It i s also possible that war wiU becume obsolete prior to the
dimate stalemate, because man might take it upon himself to

In the meantime, however, war might not be obsolete, because
people might k b t w that wars can be fought without fantastic
danger. In adher wm&, people might believe the coasquenaes
of war to be less terrible than the consquenw of not being both
able and uilling to fight a war.
Whether or not a war is gotentidy too dangerous to fight will
depend of mme upon individual outlook. How many death can
be trohtd? Who will do the "tolerating'? The political leaders?
The people thanse1vres? What are the chances for recovery3 Will
anyone want to survive and "recover"? What are the h c e s of
reouvery? In any event, it seems likely that continued ase of the
war cystem will involve the violent deaths of tens of milliom to
hundreds of
of persons, coup11ed with the serious risk
that economic recovery might not be.possible. For as long as
people and their govements are willing to take such risks-for
PS long as people and their governments continue to deposit con-fidin violence as the Uwmn ratio of human disagreementsthe war system d be the indispensable vehicle of resolution.
It is - dear tbat ending the war system.demands the common
amsent of uZZ of the world's powers-those now capable of nuclear
military adventures and those who one day may be. If any one
.nation which possesses nuclear potentid belie& that the war
system is not obsolete, it will be retained. The arms race, h d y
almost incomprehensible in its capacity for mass annihilation, will
be elaborated with new elements-chemical, biological, psychological-until the arsenals are packed with devices to destroy all
the peoples of the world many times over. Yet in tbe long run the
@sly U ~ o e can
m produce no winner. In any future war the consolation prizes can only be surrender, stalemate, or &a&.
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